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Seton Hall Law

Introduction
A data breach is "the loss, theft, or other unauthorized access … to data containing
sensitive personal information, in electronic or printed form, that results in the potential
compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of the data." 1 Though there are various ways in
which personal information can be stolen, data breaches typically occur in one of three ways: (1)
hacking, (2) physical theft, and (3) point-of-sale attacks.2 Hacking, the most typical form of data
breach, occurs when “hackers [access] a company’s network and [steal] personal information.” 3
Physical theft occurs when devices capable of data storage such as backup disks or laptops are

1

38 U.S.C. § 5727

2

Andrew Hoffman, 2 Years of Clapper: Takeaways From 12 Data Breach Cases, Law360 (Jan. 19, 2017,
5:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/ articles/621745/2-years-of-clapper-takeaways-from-12-data-breach-cases
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stolen. 4 Point-of-sale attacks occur when data such as credit card information that is recorded
and processed at the time of purchase is stolen.5 In 2016 alone, millions of confidential records
were compromised through these three types of data breaches. For instance, in March of 2016,
Premier Healthcare reported a data breach, after a laptop computer which contained PHI of more
than 200,000 patients was stolen from their billing department. In August of 2016, Oracle, the
company that owns the MICROS point-of-sale system, used in more than 330,000 cash registers
around the world, announced that its system had been hacked by a Russian cybercrime group.
Then, in September of 2016, Yahoo announced that a hacker had stolen information such as email addresses, passwords, full user names, dates of birth, and telephone numbers from at least
500 million accounts. When data is breached, businesses and financial institutions exhaust
millions in financial resources to cover legal fees, fraud prevention, card reissuance, and lost
revenue, while consumers, who also suffer loss of financial resources, are greatly disadvantaged
by the fact that there are currently very few data breach liability remedies available.
The unavailability of legal remedies to properly address data breaches that occur with
great frequency and regularity is commonly referred to as the Data Breach Problem. The recent
frequency in data breaches over the past decade can be attributed to the fact that organized crime
groups have now resorted to the theft and sale of personal information, finding it to be more
reliable, safe, and lucrative than other types of organized crime. Moreover, in a technological
age, the increased use of basic credit card transactions makes personal information more widely
accessible to criminals--which, as a result, exposes businesses and consumers to a greater risk of
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loss. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a nonprofit privacy advocate site, reports that the 5,245
data breaches made public between 2005-2016, were comprised of over 900 million records.
However, the number of records breached does not represent every single record breached during
this period, since many organizations are not aware that their data has been breached or are not
required to report the breach under state reporting laws. Despite the number and volume of data
breaches that occur on an annual basis, the lack of consistent data protection creates significant
economic concern for businesses and threatens consumer protection.
Part I of this note will expand on the data breach problem. Part II will discuss the current
legal landscape of data protection in the United States. Part III will discuss the availability of
civil remedies in data breach cases. Part IV will discuss recent attempts to pass comprehensive
federal regulation. Part V will consider possible solutions to the data breach problem.

PART I.
The Data Breach Problem
Businesses use, store, and transfer sensitive information, both personal and financial,
every day for legitimate business purposes and therefore are incentivized to protect such
information in order to facilitate commerce. For instance, credit card information helps “process
nearly $ 3.5 trillion per year. . . .” 6 However, one major factor prohibiting greater data
protection, in hacking or point-of-sale attacks, is the inability to trace the point at which the data
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The Business of Banking: What Every Policy Maker Needs To Know, Am. Bankers Ass'n 1, 27 (Dec.
2016), http://www.aba.com/Tools/Economic/Documents/Businessofbanking. pdf.

was compromised. For instance, during an ordinary credit card transaction, a customer will
provide their credit card information to the merchant company; the merchant company then reads
and stores the card information; the information is transmitted to the merchant's acquiring bank,
then the acquiring bank uses the information to verify the customer's account balance with the
card-issuing bank; the card-issuing bank then releases the funds to the merchant. 7If consumer
data is compromised at any point during this long chain of transactions, it becomes nearly
impossible to determine the source of the breach. Moreover, if, after acquiring it, the merchant
company sells a consumer’s data for profit, it will no longer be possible for the merchant
company to monitor its management. As a result, the very mechanisms which help to facilitate
commerce also lend to the widespread data protection issues. The complex legal questions and
proof issues that arise from the lack of traceability in data breach cases is more cognizable under
the common law. Victims of data breach are rarely, if ever, able to succeed under contract or tort
causes of action since the contractual obligations are muddled when data is passed along multiple
relationships. With data being transferred through multiple relationships, it is difficult for courts
to determine who is obligated to whom. Therefore, the lack of traceability in data breach cases
can create an almost insurmountable burden of proof for plaintiffs due to the fact that privity can
potentially exist between multiple relationships: “card-issuing bank-customer, customermerchant, merchant-acquirer bank, acquirer bank-card network, card network-card-issuing bank,
or in the alternative, card-issuing bank-customer, customer-merchant, and merchant-integrated
card network bank.”8 Another issue is that a lack of traceability creates a great incentive for
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R. Andrew Patty II, Credit Card Issuers' Claims Arising From Large-Scale Data Breaches, 23 J. Tax'n Reg.
Fin. Instruments 5, 5, 8 (2015).
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perpetrators to steal sensitive information without the consequence of criminal or civil liability.
For instance, the sale of credit card numbers on the black market can net anywhere between $.50
and $48 per card.9 Therefore, in the absence of adequate legal protections, the theft and sale of
personal information serves as a very lucrative business for perpetrators---putting businesses and
consumers at a greater risk of losing sensitive information.

PART II.
Laws Governing Data Security: State and Federal Laws
Despite the pervasiveness of the data breach problem, the United States currently does not have a
comprehensive federal scheme to address the problem. However, privacy protection issues are
addressed in a very limited sense through scattered federal regulations, constitutional rights, state
notification laws, and the common law – all of which serve to partially address the data breach
problem.
A. State Data Breach Protection

9

Timothy Peacock & Allan Friedman, Automation and Disruption in Stolen Payment Card Markets,
Workshop on Econ. Info. Security 1, 5-7 (May 11, 2014), http://weis2014.
econinfosec.org/papers/PeacockFriedman-WEIS2014.pdf (noting that most loss occurs quickly after the breach
occurs, so slow breach notification can significantly increase fraud success, increasing reimbursement costs).

The current state law framework provides consumer protection in the event of a data breach
by way of notice to the consumer. Currently, 51 states and territories have enacted data-breach
notification laws which require companies to notify its consumers within a certain timeframe that
their personal information has been or may have been exposed. Most state notification statutes
only provide consumer protection to the extent that notice helps to prevent against the future risk
of fraudulent use of personal information. However, some state notification statutes provide a
private cause of action which allow consumers to recover damages against the breaching
company. The current state data breach notification scheme has proven problematic for
businesses, since state notification laws vary from state to state. This lack of uniformity makes
compliance burdensome and costly, particularly for national businesses that have nationwide
consumer bases. One possible solution to this compliance issue is that the state data breach
notification scheme should be preempted by comprehensive federal legislation, rather than
continue to operate in a piecemeal fashion in conjunction with other federal data breach laws.
Another possible solution is that a national business could simply comply with the strictest of all
state notification laws in order to ensure compliance with the notification laws of all of the other
states in which it has consumers. However, the dramatic differences among the state notification
laws does not allow for this to be a feasible alternative. State data breach notification laws vary
in some very significant respects: notification exemptions, timelines for notification, procedures
for notification, penalties for failure to comply with the statute, and definition of personal
information. The difference in the way in which personal information is defined by state
notification statutes is split evenly among the states. Most states define personal information as:
“(a) a first name . . . and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data
elements, when the data element is not encrypted, redacted or secured by any other method

rendering the element unreadable or unusable: (i) social security number; (ii) a number on a
driver license number. . . or number on a nonoperating identification license number; (iii) a
financial account number or credit or debit card number in combination with any required
security code, access code or password that would permit access to the individual's financial
account.” 10
However, 25 states define personal information more broadly to include passwords, PIN
numbers, access codes for financial accounts, medical information, health insurance information,
routing numbers in combination with the necessary access code or password, unique biometric
data (such as fingerprints), and individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers.11 Another
significant difference among state notification statutes is whether or not they provide timeframes
for notification. Most states do not provide specific timelines for notification, while seven states
require businesses to notify consumers within 5 - 45 days after a breach has been discovered.
Also, some states allow for delay beyond the statutory timeframe, if necessary for law
enforcement to pursue an investigation. While most states don’t provide a timeframe for
notification, 41 states do, however, require analysis of the breach’s risk of harm before
determining whether notification is even necessary. 12 In these states, businesses are required to
assess whether the breach “is likely to cause substantial economic loss to an individual” or
whether “an illegal use of personal information has occurred, or is reasonably likely to occur”

10

11

Personal Data Notification & Protection Act, H.R. 1704, 114th Cong. § 112(12) (2015).

See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501 (2013)
State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/security-breach-notificationlaws.aspx. A chart listing each of these states and their various statutory provisions regarding databreach notification
may be found at DATA BREACH CHARTS,supra note 42.
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before notice is required.13 Therefore, businesses which have consumers in these states must
comply with both of these requirements—notifying consumers within the statutory timeframe
and not notifying consumers until a risk-of-harm analysis is completed. One commonality among
state notification laws, however, is that they only require consumer notification “when the
compromised data was not encrypted, or when the encryption key was also compromised.”
These provisions are referred to as the "encrypted data safe harbor."14 Therefore, businesses with
nationwide consumer bases are only required to contact consumers in instances where the
breached data was not encrypted. Several states have attempted to address these compliance
issues by allowing business that experience a breach which affects a certain number of people to
simply post a notice on their website. 15 While substitute notice may be convenient for
businesses, substitute notice is problematic for consumers who are unlikely to go on the
company’s website to see the notice. The current data breach notification scheme is also
problematic for consumers because it reacts to data breaches rather than prevents them which, in
effect, circumvents the legislative purpose of "allow[ing] consumers to protect themselves
against identity theft" and "mitigat[ing] damages resulting" from data breaches.16
B. Federal Privacy and Data Security Laws
In addition to the state data breach notification scheme, consumers affected by a data breach
are also entitled to relief under applicable federal laws. The current federal law framework is
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HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-1 (2009)
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Jill Joerling, Data Breach Notification Laws: An Argument for a Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect
Consumer Data, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 467, 475 (2010).
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see, e.g., Customer Update on Data Breach, The Home Depot, https://corporate.
homedepot.com/mediacenter/pages/statement1.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (updating customers of a previous
data breach through a posting on their website).
16
Id. at 471.

more industry-related than consumer related in that federal privacy and data security laws are
narrowly tailored to prevent and protect breaches that occur in particular industries. For instance,
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Prevention (CFAA) was passed by Congress in 1984 in an effort
to criminalize hacking-- making it a crime to access, obtain information from, or use or transmit
something to a computer in certain instances. The CFAA also provides victims of data breaches
with a private cause of action in two limited circumstances: where a loss of at least $ 5,000 is
aggregated over a one-year period or when there is damage affecting ten or more protected
computers within a one-year period.17 Theoretically, the CFAA has great potential to provide a
remedy to consumers in a typical data breach case because it’s scope broadly encompasses any
computer "which is used in or affect[s] interstate or foreign commerce or communication",--which is any computer with internet access. 18 However, the CFAA has rarely been successful in
protecting victims of data breaches because of its requirement of a showing of substantial
economic harm. In two cases where the CFAA's private right of action was brought in regard to
an asserted data breach, the claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs could not show that
they had suffered $ 5,000 in damages.19 Moreover, the CFAA limits its application by
prohibiting private actions against entities for "negligent design or manufacture of computer
hardware, computer software, or firmware."20 Congress also passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)21 in an effort to protect individuals from

17

18 U.S.C. §1030(c)(4)(A)(i)
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18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(2)
See In re Google Android Consumer Priv. Litig., 2013 WL 1283236; In re iPhone Application Litig., 844
F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
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18 U.S.C.A. §1030(g)
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Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)

government eavesdropping and other intrusions. As a communications privacy protection law,
the ECPA makes it illegal to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications, except if such
actions are taken by a law enforcement agency with judicial approval. The ECPA also regulates
the privacy of and government access to stored electronic communications. The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA)22, one of the most significant federal health
care privacy and data security laws governing the healthcare industry to date, protects individuals
against the unauthorized access of "individually identifiable health information" relating to: [an]
individual's past, present or future physical or mental health or condition, the provision of health
care to the individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to
the individual, and that identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe
can be used to identify the individual.23 HIPPA’s Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information (“Standards”) established national standards to protect
individuals’ personal health information by requiring health plans, health care clearinghouses,
and health care providers that conduct certain health care transactions electronically to follow
appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of such information, and by placing limits and
conditions on the uses and disclosures of such information without patient authorization.24
HIPAA does not, however, provide individuals with a private cause of action for violations of its
Standards. Rather, HIPAA, allows for the Office for Civil Rights to impose a civil monetary

22
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.)
23
Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html
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penalty of $ 50,000 for each violation of it Standards. HIPAA also allows for criminal
prosecution against entities that commit specific types of violations of its Standards. Congress
has also passed a number of financial data laws, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
(GLBA)25 and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACT Act”). 26 GLBA
regulates how financial institutions handle, store, and disclose individuals' personal financial
information. GLBA consists of three parts: (1) the Financial Privacy Rule, which sets out how
the information is to be collected and disclosed by a financial institution; (2) the Safeguards
Rule, which mandates that financial institutions adopt security measures to protect the
information; and (3) the Pretexting Provisions, which prohibit the use of false pretenses in order
to access the information.27 Financial institutions that violate GLBA can face civil penalties of
anywhere up to $100,000 per violation while officers and directors of such institutions are also
subject to face civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation. GLBA also provides criminal
penalties against anyone who knowingly and intentionally obtains customer information through
the use of false pretenses. Finally, Congress passed the FACT Act with the legislative purpose of
preventing identity theft and providing consumers with better access to their credit reports.28 The
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Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15
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The Fair Credit Reporting Act was originally passed in 1970 to regulate consumer reporting agencies' use
of sensitive consumer information. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1581--1597. The Act had three main goals which included: (1)
increasing transparency in the industry for consumers; (2) protecting consumers from the damages of incorrect
information; and, (3) improving the accuracy of credit reports. Meredith Schramm-Strosser, The "Not So" Fair
Credit Reporting Act: Federal Preemption, Injunctive Relief, and The Need To Return Remedies For Common Law
Defamation To The States, 14 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 165, 170 (2012).
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Margaret Rouse, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), TECHTARGET,
http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act (last visited Jan. 19, 2017)
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(THE CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AMERICA, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL: SUMMARY OF
FEDERAL LAWS, http://counsel.cua.edu/fedlaw/fcra.cfm)

Red Flags Rules of 2007 help carry out the FACT Act’s legislative purpose of preventing
identity theft by requiring certain institutions to "identify and respond to account activities that
are possible indicators ‘red flags' of identity theft . . . ." 29
PART III.
Civil Remedies
In addition to the limited protections provided under state and federal laws, civil remedies
provide little relief to victims of data breach cases. Generally, injured parties are entitled to civil
remedies, in either state or federal court, through various legal remedies such as: breach of
contract, breach of implied contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, public disclosure of
private facts, and emotional distress. However, these claims only tend to be successful in cases
where the breaching company has not provided timely notification.30 Moreover, tort remedies are
rarely, if ever, successful in data breach cases, since the economic loss doctrine bars recovery
where only purely economic losses are asserted. For instance, In re Michaels Stores PIN Pad
Litigation, held that claims of negligence and negligence per se could not survive dismissal when
personal injury or property damages could not be demonstrated and only increased risk of
identity theft and economic loss damages were alleged.”31 Similarly, in Rowe v. UniCare Life
and Health Insurance Co., held that in a tort action, damages for emotional distress could only
be recovered if the plaintiff could show "he suffered from some present injury beyond mere

29

Yoon-Young Lee, FACT Act "Red Flag" Rules, WILMERHALE (Sept. 2, 2008),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubId= 91356.
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Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation--A Tough Road for Plaintiffs, 55 FALL Bos.
B.J. 27, 29 (2011); see also In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d at 527--28, 531 (allowing claims
under breach of implied contract and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act to stand,
citing the fact that Michaels did not timely notify its customers of the data breach in its reasoning for upholding both
claims).
31
In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d at 526, 531.

exposure of his information to the public."32 Claims for breach of fiduciary duty also tend to be
unsuccessful due to the lack of fiduciary obligation between the consumer and the breaching
company.33 For instance, in Andersen v. Hannaford Brothers Co., plaintiff’s debit card
information was compromised after defendant's electronic payment process system was hacked,
however the First Circuit dismissed plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, holding that in
order to establish a fiduciary duty a plaintiff must: "(1) allege 'the actual placing of trust and
confidence' in the defendant; (2) 'show that there is some disparity in the bargaining positions of
the parties;' and (3) show 'that the dominant party has abused its position of trust.'" 34 The First
Circuit found that, because Andersen involved a grocery store, there was nothing but a fair
exchange of groceries for money, and there was no evidence that the defendant had taken
advantage of the plaintiff. On the other hand, breach-of-implied-contract claims have shown
some success in the data breach context. In Anderson, the First Circuit, found that an implied
contract to safeguard data could exist between consumers and companies they purchase from
since the company would "not use the credit card data for other people's purchases, would not
sell the data to others, and would take reasonable measures to protect the information." 35The
breach-of-implied-contract remedy therefore appears to be limited when a company has taken
reasonable measures to protect the consumer information. Another issue that plaintiffs of data
breach cases face, in addition to a limited likelihood of success on the merits, is an inability to
meet the standing requirement in federal courts. The standing requirement comes from Article III

32
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Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09-C-2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010).
IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW 27.07 (2d ed. 2013)
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Andersen v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 157 (1st Cir. 2011).
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of the U.S. Constitution.36 In order to bring a “case or controversy” in federal court, a plaintiff
must satisfy three elements of standing: First, the plaintiff must have "suffered an ‘injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest." The injury complained of must be "actual or
imminent, not "conjectural' or "hypothetical.'" Second, a plaintiff's claim must arise from an
injury that "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of a defendant." Third, a favorable court
decision must be able to redress the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff bears the burden to establish
all three elements.37 Generally, the first element—the “injury in fact” requirement—is the most
difficult to establish in data breach cases since it requires plaintiffs to show they suffered an
“actual or imminent” injury. In data breach cases, establishing an actual injury tends to be
problematic because many credit companies and financial institutions will refund and void
fraudulent purchases as a matter of industry practice. So, while one might feel troubled after
learning their personal information has been compromised, the legitimacy of this concern is
minimized by the inability to establish an actual injury in federal court. Plaintiffs who seek relief
in federal court are therefore left with the alternative option of claiming that they will suffer an
imminent injury from the breach. Indeed, a consumer whose personal information is
compromised is now at a greater risk of becoming a victim of identity theft at some point in the
future. However, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of standing in Clapper v. Amnesty
International has made it difficult for plaintiffs with claims of an imminent future injury to the
satisfy standing requirement.38 In Clapper, plaintiffs were lawyers, human rights researchers, and
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U.S. Const. art. III §2.

Patricia Cave, Comment, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand On: Finding Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution
to the Barrier from Federal Courts in Data Security Breach Suits, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 765, 772 (2013) (citing Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
38
Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149-50 (2013).

journalists who worked with certain foreign clientele that could have been subject to U.S.
government surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”).39
Plaintiffs attempted to bring a claim to challenge Section 702 of FISA (" § 1881a") -- which
allows the government to obtain foreign intelligence information on foreign powers and those
associated with foreign powers for national security purposes.40 Plaintiffs needed to
communicate regularly with people subject to government surveillance under § 1881a for work
related purposes but were forced to stop certain telephone and e-mail conversations and use
alternative methods of communication, such as traveling abroad to have in person conversations,
in order to avoid being targeted under § 1881a.41 The plaintiffs asserted two separate theories of
Article III standing: (1) they would suffer injury because there was "an objectively reasonable
likelihood that their communications [would] be acquired under § 1881a at some point in the
future," and (2) they had already suffered injury because "the risk of surveillance under § 1881a
[was] so substantial that they had been forced to take costly and burdensome measures to protect
the confidentiality of their international communications.”42 The Court ultimately ruled that the
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement for standing. The Court reasoned that
plaintiffs failed to establish that the government surveillance caused an actual injury or an
imminent future injury since any potential future injury depended on the occurrence of a “highly
attenuated chain of possibilities.”43 As the Court explained, plaintiff’s argument required a long

39

Id. at 1157.

40

Id. at 1142.

41
Id. at 1157.
42
43

Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1148

chain of inferences: (1) the Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S.
persons with whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its
authority under § 1881a rather than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III
judges who serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will conclude that the
Government's proposed surveillance procedures satisfy § 1881a's many safeguards and are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the Government will succeed in intercepting the
communications of respondents' contacts; and (5) respondents will be parties to the particular
communications that the Government intercepts. 44 Some courts have viewed Clapper as
imposing a very rigorous standard for plaintiffs alleging future injury of identity theft, while
others distinguish Clapper as unique on its facts. The latter interpretation makes most logical
sense since the plaintiffs in Clapper merely suspected that the government intercepted their
communications with potential terrorists; however, in data breach cases the threat of future harm
is not nearly as speculative since the data has already been stolen or compromised. Lewert v.
P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., illustrates the chilling effect that Clapper had on granting
standing in data breach cases.45 In Lewert, the plaintiffs alleged injury stemming from a data
breach at P.F. Chang’s that compromised an estimated seven million cards.46 The Seventh
Circuit, however, dismissed plaintiff’s claims about increased risk of identity theft in the future,
reasoning that the harm was not “imminent” since it could take several years to occur, and that
“there is no reason to believe that identity theft protection was necessary” after the cancellation
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Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-CV-4787, 2014 WL 7005097, at 1, 4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10,
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of a debit card.47 After Clapper, Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC was the first appellate
court case to provide a breakthrough toward establishing standing in data breach cases. In
Remijas, Neiman Marcus customers brought a class action suit against Neiman Marcus after a
company cyberattack caused fraudulent charges to appear on their credit cards.48 The plaintiffs
asserted two imminent injuries: "an increased risk of future fraudulent charges and greater
susceptibility to identity theft."49 Though the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint based
on a narrow reading of Clapper as foreclosing the use of future injuries to establish Article III
standing in data breach situations, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit read Clapper
more broadly. The court distinguished Remijas from Clapper based on the differences in facts.
The court stated that the threat of potential injury to plaintiffs was reasonably likely to occur
because making fraudulent charges or assuming the plaintiffs' identities was the very reason why
hackers stole credit card information from Neiman Marcus in the first place. 50The court also
held that the two other requirements of standing, causation and redressability, were satisfied.51
As for the causation element, the court was liberal in finding that Neiman Marcus’s malware
possibly caused plaintiff’s information to be exposed--though one could argue that hackers
obtained the credit card information through other avenues.52 In regards to redressability, the
court reasoned that plaintiffs would benefit from a favorable decision since there was no

47

Id.; Note that the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc.
recently in April 2016 following the Remijas standard. Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-3700, 2016
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guarantee that the injuries plaintiffs suffered or would suffer would be fully reimbursed, due to a
variety of restrictions on credit card and debit card liability rules regarding prompt reporting and
other variables. 53 In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s approach to standing in Remijas provides
plaintiffs in data breach cases with a greater chance of bringing a claim in federal court.
Although civil remedies might not be the ultimate solution to the data breach problem, the
adoption of a more relaxed standing requirement is an effective method to address the data
breach problem within the current legal framework. In addition, a more relaxed standing
requirement allows for more class actions to be brought against big businesses. Class actions
have traditionally served as a powerful tool for consumers to keep big corporations responsible.
Any increased ability to utilize class actions also serves as a potentially useful vehicle for
moving towards regulatory reform, since successful data breach class action suits, and
subsequent pushback by companies who have to bear the financial burden without adequate
guidelines, will hopefully generate enough momentum for the federal government to move
towards a more comprehensive regulatory solution. 54

PART IV.

53

Id.

54
2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 544

Attempts to Pass Comprehensive Federal Legislation
Despite the existence of various federal laws which aim to protect consumer data and privacy in
specific industries or instances, Congress has not yet been successful in creating a uniform
standard to addresses consumer data protection in all industries, partly because of the difficulty
of gaining bipartisan support. While Democrats and Republicans could agree that there is a need
for a more uniform standard, constant division on the substantive aspects of proposed data
protection laws has prevented Congress from setting a uniform standard. The current patchwork
of state laws and industry-related federal laws governing data protection in the U.S. is therefore
due to the numerous policy disagreements on the data breach problem. Hence, recent attempts to
pass uniform data protection laws have resulted in a substantive compromise of a proposed bill.
For instance, several of the cybersecurity and data privacy bills that were introduced in the 113th
Congress needed to be compromised in scope for them to even have a chance of gaining
bipartisan support. The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 was one of the few data security
bills introduced in the 113th Congress which successfully passed into law.55 The Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act was originally proposed as a bill which aimed to address cybersecurity issues
by giving regulatory power to the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop
“voluntary, industry-led set of standards…to cost effectively reduce cyber risks to critical
infrastructure.” 56 The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act easily received bipartisan support,
partially because it delegates regulatory authority to a private entity rather than to federal or state
agencies, but also because it left out certain sections which potentially could have provided even

55

Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 1353, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1353.
56

Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 1353, 113th Cong. § 101(a)(2) (2014)

greater data security---such as, a comprehensive data-sharing plan that would facilitate
cooperation between companies and the government to combat breaches. 57 This very same
comprehensive data-sharing plan was later included in the Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Act of 2014, which partly explains why this Act didn’t gain the support it needed to become law.
The Cybersecurity Information Act of 2014 aimed to provide cybersecurity and encourage the
sharing of consumer data between businesses, including government and private businesses, by
authorizing private entities to monitor information systems and share any potential cybersecurity
threat indicators. 58 Despite its well-intended purpose, privacy protection advocates strongly
opposed the bill out of fear that allowing “cybersecurity information” to be shared between
government and businesses and authorizing private entities to monitor personal information,
would also authorize the government to request that private entities provide it with access to a
wide variety of personal information, which could be used in criminal proceedings. 59 Privacy
advocates feared that bill would effectively allow the government to circumvent the privacy
protections provided for in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Another reason that
contributed to the bill’s lack of support is that it provided civil immunity to the private entities
that were supposed to monitor sensitive information or share threat indicators. Proponents of the
bill argued that immunizing businesses from liability would further the bill’s purpose of
encouraging information sharing between businesses. However, opponents believed that
providing civil immunity to businesses would undercut the bill’s intended purpose of providing
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greater cybersecurity since immunization could potentially eliminate the accountability
businesses owe consumers and would also encourage businesses to share data without consumer
authorization. The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014 was another bill introduced in
the 113th Congress that failed to become law due to a lack of bipartisan support.60 The Personal
Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014 aimed to provide greater consumer privacy protection by
providing increased punishments for data privacy violations, such as identify theft and willful
concealment of breaches, requiring business participation in a security program, and instituting a
sixty-day timeline within which businesses and federal agencies must disclose breaches to
individuals whose personally identifiable information had been compromised. 61 Unsurprisingly,
this bill did not pass into law due to strong congressional disagreements. The Data Security Act
of 2014 aimed to provide consumer protection by requiring businesses to notify consumers of
security breaches.62 One criticism that prevented this bill from becoming law was that it did not
mandate businesses to follow any mandatory security procedures, but instead gave businesses
too much discretion to create and follow their own “reasonable” security policies and procedures.
Another criticism to the bill was that it contradicted its own legislative purpose of providing
consumer protection since it did not allow consumers to bring a private right of action for
violations of the Act in state court, denying consumers of legal remedies it intends to provide.
The Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2014 attempted to create a uniform standard
for data breach notification.63 The Act would have given the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
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power to set security standards for businesses that possessed personal information along with the
power to set a strict thirty-day notification standard. 64 The Act also gave the United States
Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation enforcement power to criminalize any
“intentional or willful” concealment of a breach that results in economic harm of at least $1000.
65

This provision had potential to be very effective in encouraging businesses to notify affected

consumers immediately after a breach is discovered. Another potential benefit under the Act is
that it would have preempted the scattered state notification scheme and provided national
businesses with a more clear and uniform standard. Unfortunately, the bill was unable to gain the
Republican support it needed since it conflicted with a similar Republican proposed bill. The
conflicting bill sought to give the Federal Trade Commission enforcement power against
businesses who failed to take reasonable steps to protect personal data—without giving the FTC
any additional power to set standards for data security. 66The Personal Data Protection and
Breach Accountability Act of 2014 aimed to protect consumer data through setting a series of
safeguards for business entities to follow in their data privacy programs and strict penalties for
businesses that did not properly protect personal information or timely notify customers of a
breach of their information. 67 The provisions in this bill were extremely consumer friendly:
authorized punishment for intentional or willful concealment of a data breach of personal
information; private causes of action for the willful concealment of a data breach with no dollar
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amount requirement; private causes of action for economic harm or "substantial emotional
distress" to at least one person; remedies following a breach such as free credit monitoring
services, a security freeze on the individual's credit report, and a reimbursement of costs resulting
from the breach, including costs resulting from identity theft; individuals would be allowed to
bring suits for damages of up to $ 20,000,000 as well as punitive damages for willful or
intentional violations.68 Unfortunately, the bill did not pass, and it died with the adjournment of
the 113th Congress. Still, one can predict that the bill would have received strong opposition
from business focused organizations since they would have to bear most of the burden of this
consumer-friendly legislation. Recent measures proposed during the 114th Congress have aimed
to address the issues that prevented the passage of earlier bills. For instance, President Obama
recently proposed the Personal Data Notification & Protection Act of 2015 during the 114th
Congress as another attempt to pass a uniform breach notification law. 69 The Personal Data
Notification & Protection Act contains similar parts of other bills, but applies to a wider range of
personal information including: (1) first and last name in combination with several different
elements, (2) a government-issued identification number, including a social security number or
driver's license number, (3) biometric data including fingerprints or voice prints, (4) unique
account identifiers, and (5) a username in combination with a password or security question.70
The bill also gives the Federal Trade Commission rulemaking authority and sets a strict standard
of notification to the Federal Trade Commission--thirty days after the entity discovers the breach.
The Personal Data Notification & Protection Act has an exception that does not require
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companies to disclose breaches unless there is a reasonable risk that the individuals whose data
was affected will be harmed (similar to the risk analysis provisions found in some state
notification laws). Also, the Federal Trade Commission and state Attorneys General would
handle the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. The Personal Data Notification &
Protection Act contains a range of much needed data security provisions, but as is often the case
it only takes one small provision to derail the whole thing. However, even if not adopted in its
entirety, the Act sets a high standard for the definition of sensitive personally identifiable
information and notification deadlines. The Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015 is
another bill that was introduced during the 114th Congress. 71 This Act gives the Federal Trade
Commission rulemaking authority over information security; and requires notification in at least
30 days, unless notice would not be feasible. 72 The Act also preempts state laws relating to data
security and breach notification, but it does not preempt state law tort, contract, trespass, or fraud
claims. Considering the concerns surrounding the failed bills of the 113th Congress, the Data
Security & Breach Notification Act of 2015 could serve as a compromise for passing the
comprehensive data security and breach notification law that the United States needs.
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PART V.
Potential Solution to the Data Breach Problem
The data breach problem is of paramount concern to businesses and consumers who, in a
global economy, use, store, and access sensitive information every day. The increased frequency
and regularity of data breaches proves that the current patchwork of state and federal laws does
not effectively address or prevent the widespread data security issues in the U.S. Hence, a clear
uniform legal standard for breach notification and comprehensive data security is much needed.
Although Democrats and Republicans tend to be divided in the area of data security and breach
notification, it is possible to achieve bipartisan support by adopting rules from some of the failed
data security and breach notification bills. Given the vast differences in state notification laws
across the country, Congress should prioritize adopting a comprehensive breach notification law.
Congress should develop a strong breach notification standard like that in the Personal Data
Notification and Protection Act, so that the federal standard would be closer to even the strictest
of state standards. The Data Security & Breach Notification Act of 2015 is a good attempt to
reach a compromise on the issues that divide Democrats and Republican with regard to breach
notification. Moreover, if this Act were to be enacted it would preempt scattered state laws, and
therefore provide more uniformity. However, breach notification only matters when the breach
has already occurred, and it does little to prevent breaches. A comprehensive data security
legislation that gives regulatory and rulemaking authority to the Federal Trade Commission to
create broad security standards but which allows business to develop their own data security
procedures. Greater federal regulation is needed for businesses to improve their methods of

handling sensitive, personal information. In addition, federal regulation should require there to
be more transparency regarding the data security practices that each business practices so that
consumers can know exactly what data security practices each company uses to protect their
personal information, and how those procedures compare to national or industry norms. There
also needs to be a clear private right of action under a federal data privacy law. For example, a
negligence cause of action which would create a duty for the company to protect a customer's
data when it is given to them. When the company does not take sufficient measures to protect the
data, it has breached its duty to the consumer. A data security law that provides a cause of action
for negligence could avoid additional federal regulations since companies would then have every
incentive to handle personal information as securely as possible, without clear regulation.

